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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PETER A. PETERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
10900 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant was charged with the crime of assault 
with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm. He 
was convicted of the crime on January 13, 1967, in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County. This is an 
appeal from that conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried in the lower court subsequent 
to a plea of not guilty to a charge of assault with a deadly 
weapon with intent to do bodily harm.Upon a trial by jury 
he was found guilty and convicted of the crime as charged 
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON A!PPEAL 
The respondent seeks affirmation of the lower court's 
judgment and appeUant's conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is in general agreement with the state-
ment O'f facts as contained in the appellant''S brief with the 
following exceptions, additions and alterations: 
1. That while Miss Skelton testified that Mr. Magnu-
son tried to choke her (Tr. 44), Mr. Magnuson asser't'S that 
he only tried to kiss her, at which time "she jumped up 
against the wall" (Tr. 15). 
2. The cut inflicted on the hand of Mr. Magnuson re-
quired six stitches to cloise (Tr. 25). 
3. The verdict returned by the jury said nothing about 
great bodily harm (R. 24), nor is the degree of harm in-
tended a:s an element of the offense. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS 
REQUIRED TO CONVICT FOR THE CRIMINAL OF-
FENSE CHARGED IS A MATTER TO BE DECIDED 
BY THE JURY, AND AN APPELLATE COURT IS 
PRECLUDED FROM RE'VERSING A CONVICTION 
WHERE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT SO THAT 
REASONABLE MINDS ACTING FAIRLY UPON IT 
COULD FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY BE,YOND 
A REASONA1BLE DOUBT. 
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A. Specific intent is an issue of fact to be determined 
by the jury. 
One of the elements of the crime for which the ap-
pellant was convicted was "that the said assault was done 
with the intent to do bodily harm .... " (R. 21). 
The appellant's main argument is, in essence, that the 
evidence presented at the trial was insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to susta:in t'he conviction in that the spedific 
intent required to commit the crime was not adequately 
shown. Thus, the appellant would have the court believe, 
in a round about way, that the determinati'on of intent is 
a matter of law as opposed to fact. 
In the case of State v. Jensen, 120 U. 531, 236 P.2d 445 
(1951), the court said, "The question of intent is practical-
ly always one for the jury." 
On a number of occasions, California courts have treat-
ed this same issue. In People v. Pineda, 41 C.A.2d 100, 106 
P.2d 25 (1940), the court held: 
Where specific intent is a necessary element of an 
offense, the intent is a question of fact to be de-
termined from all the circumstances, and, except 
where facts proven afford no reasonable ground for 
inference as to intent, it i's the province of the jury 
to find the intent and to say what particular intent 
follows from the •acts done. 
Later in People v. Bateman, 175 C.A.2d 69, 345 P.2d 334 
(1959), California Courts reiterated their position, "Intent 
with which an act is done may be gathered from all cir-
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cumstances shown in the evidence and is a question of fact." 
This universality of opinion was also displ'ayed in the 
Oklahoma case of Ogelsby v. State, 411 P.2d 974 (Okla. 
1966), in which the court declared: 
... intent, in a case where specific intent is a neces-
sary element of the offense, is a question of fact for 
the jury, to be determined from all the circum-
stances and beyond a reasonable doubt .... 
In helping juries to decide this issue, the very nature 
of intent has been of some assistance, and certain presump-
tions are authorized. In People v. Vogel, 46 C.Zd 798, 299 
P.2d 850 (1956), the California Supreme Court said in es-
sence: 
An unlawful act proved to have been done by per-
son accused thereof is presumed to have been in-
tended, and burden is on him to prove justification 
or excuse overcoming such presumption. 
Mr. Justice Crockett, expressing the views of this court 
in Uintah Freight Lines\'. Public Service Commission, 119 U. 
491, 229 P.2d 675 (1951) said," ... in criminal cases ... a per-
son is presumed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences O·f his unlawful acts .... " 
This view was also voiced in the Washington case of 
State v. Leach, 6 Wash.2d 641, 219 P.2d 972 (1950), where 
the State Supreme Court held: 
Although commission of an overt act does n·ot 
establish the particular intent to commit a specific 
crime, yet intent, being a state •of mind, may be in-
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£erred by the jury from all the facts and circum-
stances as is the case in consummated crimes. (Em-
phasis added.) 
From the foregoing, it can be easily ascertained that the 
matter of intent is an issue of fact to be determined by the 
jury. It is within their province not only to weigh the per-
tinent evidence but to determine whether such evidence 
has in fact indicated the requisite intent. In the instant 
case, the jury weighed the evidence presented and appro-
priately concluded that the appellant had in fact enter-
tained the specific intent to do bodily harm. 
B. Role of appellate court in reviewing criminal con-
victions. 
The role of an appellate court in reviewing criminal 
convictions has been traditionally restdcted so as to pre-
serve the judicial system generally. The sanctity of the 
jury as the trier of fact has been held inviolate, and the 
standards of review applied by appellate courts have re-
flected 'that degree of respect. 
1. Courts will not invade the province of the jury. 
In State v. Whitely, 100 U. 14, llO P.2d 337 (1941), this 
court through Chief Ju~tice Moffat expressed its Views 
vis-a-vis the proper respect to be 'accorded the jury func-
tion. It said: 
The findings of fact made by a jury or the trial 
court sitting as a jury, when supported by substan-
tial evidence, are final and will not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
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The Californi1a Supreme Court ruled similarly in Peo-
ple v. Henderson, 34 C.2d 340, 209 P.2d 785 (1949): 
Quest'ions of weight of evidence and credibility of 
witnesses are for trial court and where circumstan-
ces reasonably justify finding of guilt, an opposing 
view that they also may be reconciled with inno-
cence will not warrant interference with judgment 
on appeal. 
A later case decided by the same court wherein a writ 
of certiorari was denied resulted in a decision, Which in es-
sence held that it was not the 'function of an appellate 
court in a criminal case to reweigh the evidence. People v. 
Wein, 50 C.2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958). Th1is court in the 
case of State v. Hedger, 14 U.2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 (1963) has 
more recently treated this very subject: 
In answer to the appellate's contentions, which go 
to the weight of the evidence, we need only reiterate 
the oft-stated rule that unless it can be said as a 
matter of law that the finder of fact made ·an er-
roneous decision, this Court will not weigh the evi-
dence. 
Two other cases are particularly in poiint with our pres-
ent case. In People v. Reichenan, 173 C.A.2d 584, 343 P.2d 
603 (1959), the court said in essenct that "where each ele-
ment of an offense is a question of fact for jury, the jury's 
determination should not be disturbed on appeal." 
In t'he case of Bayne v. State, 72 Oki.Cr. 52, 112 P .Zd 
1113 (1941), involving an assault with a deadly weapon 
with intent to do bodily harm, the Oklahoma Co1urt said 
that "a conviction for ass1ault with intent to do bodily harm 
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should no't be disturbed, even where the evidence was con-
flicting." 
In the instant case, the jury found sufficient facts to 
satisfy each of the elements of the crime, and upon those 
conclusions the appellant was convicted. As has been shown, 
it is not the prerogative of a reviewing court to interfere 
with this jealously guarded jury function. 
2. Standard applied in reviewing convictions. 
In consonance with the foregoing display of the right-
ful function of the jury in a criminal conviction, it is ne1:es-
sary to relate thait function with t'he standards applied by 
courts reviewing such convictions. There is an abundance 
of Utah law outlining these standards to be applied. 
In State v. Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), 
in which certiorari was denied, this court held: 
Before a verdict may properly be set aside, i't must 
appear that evidence was so inconclusive or unsatis-
factory th1at reasonable minds acting fairly upon it 
must have entertained reasonable doubt that de-
fendan't commi'tted the crime, and unless evidence 
compels such conclusion as matter of law, verdict 
must stand. 
In State v. Ward, 10 U.2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959), this 
court further declared: 
... it is the prerogative of the jury to judge the 
credibil'i'ty of the witnesses and to determine th:e 
facts; . . . evidence will be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict; and ... if when so 
viewed it appears that the jury, acting fairly and 
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reason·ably could find the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be dis-
turbed. 
Even more recent1y, it was Justice Wade, w'hile voicing 
the majority opinion in State v. Berchtold, 11 U.2d 208, 357 
P.2d 183 (1960) who said: 
We reverse a jury verdict only where we conclude 
from a consideration of all of the evidence and the 
inference therefrom viewed in the light most fa-
vorable to such verdict that the findings are unrea-
sonable. 
Perhaps the latest expre~sion of this court on the matter 
is contained in State v. Canfield, 18 U.2d 292, 442 P.2d 196 
(1967). Here Chief Justice Crockett speaking for the court 
said: 
It is our dulty to respect the prerogative of the jury 
as the exclus'ive judges of the credi'bility of the wit-
nesses and as the determiners of the facts. Conse-
quently, we assume that they believed the State's 
evidence, and we survey it, together with all fair 
inferences, that the jury could reasonably draw 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to their ver-
dict. 
Needle'ss to say, Utah is not done in applying these 
standards. The New Mexico Supreme Court in City of Ros-
Well v. Hall, 45 N.E. 116, 112 P.2d 505 (1941) has said: 
We have held in numerous cases that if there is 
substantial evidence to support a judgment or sen-
tence in a civil or criminal case that it will no't be 
d'isturbed on appeal; and in determining whether 
there is substantial evidence we will con~der only 
that part of the evidence supporting the judgment, 
and reject the opposing or conflicting testimony. 
In People v. Ketchel, 59 C.2d 503, 381 P.2d 394 (1963), the 
Supreme Court of California expressed, in e'ssence, the fol-
lowing: 
An appellate court will search only for substantial 
evidence to support conclusion of trier of fact where 
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is 
raised on appeal, and every fact reasonably deduc-
ible from the evidence will be assumed in favor of 
the judgment. 
Thus can be seen the attitude with which the court 
must approach this appeal by this appellant. Unless his ap-
peal can withstand t'he rigors of these exacting standards 
of review, it must of necessity fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The resondent submits that there was sufficient evi-
dence whereby the jury, in exercising its proper function as 
the trier of fact, could have found as it did that the appel-
lant had the requisite intent to inflict bodily harm. The 
respondent further submits t'hat this court is precluded from 
disturbing those findings of fact and should affirm the con-
viction of the appellant as adjudged in the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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